In this paper an Edgeworth Process for economies with firmsis defined, and its stability is proved. The process constrains trade to occur if and only if there is, at the given prices, a trade that increases the sum of utilities and profits without decreasing the utility of a household or the profits of a firm. A proof of conveE gence of prices to an equilibrium price vector is provided.
Besides the original works showil1g the stability of the Hahn Process for exchange economies (see [11] and [13] ) a series of st� bility results in a Hahn Process framework were obtained by Frank lin Fisher. The introduction of firms (but no production out of e quilibrium) was effected in {51, and that of quantity of CDnstraints in [81. Also, production and consumption were allowed in [6, 7, and 91, in models that contained assumptions closely related to the Hahn Process restrictions.
The literature on the Edgeworth Process has been much less a bundant, and the results obtained less general. In the original works of Uzawa [23, 241 and also in [1, 12 , and 17J, proofs of sta bility of the Edgeworth Process for exchange economies were obtai ned. Of these proofs I that in [11 is the most satisfactory. A dis crete version of the process with demand corresfQndences instead of demand functions was shown to converge to the set of Pareto optliMl allocations in [3] I with the use of a vector-valued Lyapounov funE tion. In [21] price changes are determined by "short-run demands", which are the directions in which small trades provide the largest utility gains to households. This, version of the process is also stable, as shown in [21] . Finally, in [10] the methods and results of (21J are extended to monetary exchange economies. But no fiuther extensions appear to be available.
The main purpose of this paper is to begin to extend the Edg� worth Process in the direction of realism, as has been done for the Hahn Process. We define an Edgeworth Process for an economy with firms but no production and prove its stability. We also give a satisfactory proof of the convergence of prices to their equili brium values. In previous works in which, as in the present one, demands are determined by utility (or profit) maximization [1, 12, 17, 23, and 24] , such a proof is either absent or incorrect. The possibility of extensions wi�l be discussed and some of the limita tions of the process pOinted out. It will be argued that the pre sent form of the Edgeworth Process is not likely to produce sensi ble stability results in a world of money-mediated exchange like the one in Arrow and Hahn [1, p. 340] . The question of the compatibility of the Edgeworth Process with models in which consumption and production take place out of equilibrium will also be discus sed.
By an economy with firms but no production (and, by the way, households but no consumption) we mean an economy in which produc tion and consumption occur only after equilibrium is reached. Hou seholds and firms exchange commitments to buy and sell commodities at equilibrium. When equilibrium is reached production and consumE.
tion take place, and the commitments are carried out. A more detai led description of such an economy is given in Section 2.
Although the economy modeled here retains many of the essen tial characteristics of the one modeled for the Hahn Process in [5] , there are some differences between them. The most important of these is the absence of a separate treatment for money and of financial restrictions on exchange in the present work. It will be argued in Section 5 that in the Edgeworth Process assumption is incompatible with money-medi�ted exchange. That is, the Edgeworth Process is essentially a barter process. Accordingly, there is no distinction between active and target excess demands, and we assume all realized profits of firms to be distributed at each point of time. This assumption as regards profit-distribution is made o� ly for convenience, because under a rule .that would guarantee asy� ptotic distribution of all realized profits our results would still hold. Moreover, without an explicit treatment of money this is a sensible assumption: if firms do not face financial constraints they need 'only hold money for production purposes. The reader can consider the results of this paper as concerning only this class of economies, or he can assume away the difficulties with a more detailed treatment of money. associated
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we de fine the model, and in Section 3 the dynamic process is specified.
The form of the Edgeworth Process proposed in this paper consists in assuming that transactions will occur at a moment of time if
and only if there is some strictly Pareto superior (in a sense that will be specified below) allocation that is budget-feasible for all agents, and that when transactions take place the utilities of households and the profits of firms do not decrease, with at least one of these increasing strictly Z .
In Section 4 some preliminary results and the main theorem are proved. The method of proof owes much to [2] and to [24J . The Z We employ for shortness the expression "Pareto superior" to allocate a that is being compared to allocation b if:
PS1) The utility of each household at a is not less than its utility at b. PSZ) No firm has smaller profits at a than at h.
b.
If also PS3 is satisfied, we say that a is strictly Pareto superior to PS3) Either some household strictly prefers a to b or some firm has strictly higher profits at a than at h. discussion of limitations and possible extensions is presented in Section 5.
2.

THE MODEL
As in [5] , an economic process with firms but no production (or, indeed, consumption) before equilibrium is reached is modeled.
Households and firms exchange commitments to buy and sell cornmod! ties, including labor. When equilibrium is reached, production and consumption take place and these commitments are carried out.
There are N commodities, H households, and F firms. The first commodity is the numeraire, and its price is assumed to be at unity. fixed
Each household has its preferences representable by a contin � ously differentiable, monotonic, and strictly quasiconcave utility function, U n ' defined on the nonnegative orthant of R N .3 Also, the re is no satiation consumption for household h.
At time t, household h holds a psysical amount of commodit.y i and commitments to deliver and/or receive that commodity. As the distinction between these two components of its holdings of commo dity i is irrelevant for our purposes, we consider only the "actuaP stock of commodity i with household h in what follows. This is, of 3 We allow for the existence of a set of commodities whose consumption has no effect on Uh. The property of strict quasiconcavity applies to the restric tion of li h to the subspace of RN that corresponds to the complement of that set, i.e., to the set of commodities whose consumption affects lih in a non -trivial way.
course, the sum of the two tY'pes of holdings, and is denoted by x hi ' or x hi (t) . For these, and other variables in the model, the notation will be frequently simplified by omitting explicit refe rence to their dependence on time.
The desired stock of commodity i by household h is detoned X hi (t) , or simply x hi " Desired stocks are determined by utility maximization at prices p (1, P 2 ' ••• , P N ) ' , where the prime deno tes transposition, given a budget constraint (1 ) where x h = (X h1 ' x h2 , ... , x hN ) I and the "virtual" wealth w h of household h is given by ( 2 ) and X h = (x h1 ' x h2 ' " " x hN ) '. The household is assumed to demand a zero amount of those commodities that enter trivially its utility function.
In equation (2) with the inequality holding strictly for 1=1, and that ¢ f is a strictly convex function of those variables from which it is not independent 4 . when v fi > 0 we say that v fi is an output of firm ff otherwise we say that v fi is an input.
The actual commitment to de � iver commodity i by firm f is de noted v fi and the corresponding desired commitment is v fi ' In or der to understand the maximizing behavior that generates the desl red commitments of firms we need some further definitions. First,
Now, the realized profits of firm f are denoted by TI f , and given by
1: piT) '
and its desired profits TI f are the optimal value of the problem subject to v £ y f where the maximization takes place over those commodities from which $ f is not independent, and it is a assumed that the firm 4 Note that this rules out constant returns to scale.
wants to end up with zero co�itments of the remaining commoditie�
We also assume that for each positive price vector p this problem has a solution. By strict convexity this solution is unique, and we denote it by v f (p) . Then we clearly have
For s' implicity, we assume that firms are owned only by house 
Since there is no uncertainty and everyone has the same price expectations, namely that prices will not change, there is no mar ket for these shares. The variables s h and d h of equation (2) sa-
f=1 5 We refer the reader to [4] for a discussion of equations (3) and (4). and of other aspects of the basic model.
Taking (4) into account we see that
• ,HI
and thus demand fUnctions x h
being the utility maximizing consumption of household h at prices p and wealth w h given by x h and v substituted in (7) and (2) . The fact that virtual wealths are used to generate demands constitutes a weakness. of the model, since it implies that households know the desired profits of firms.
always Before proceeding, it is convenient to introduce some additio nal notation
The fact that the economy is closed is expressed by
Walras' Law can be deduced from (1) , (2) , (4), (5), (6) and (8), and has the form A vector (p x v) £ R (H + 1lN x R F N is said to be a competitive , , + equilibrium if (x, v). £ S and
It can be shown that if (Prx,vl is a competitive equilibrium then (x ,v) is a Pareto optimal allocation. It is worthwhile noti cing that the equilibria of the process are autarchic. That is , th� re is no trade at equilibrium. F or a discussion of the appropriat� ness of this equilibrium concept for non_tatonne�ent models wit hout production and consumption outside of equilibrium, see [18] . 
3.
THE DYNAMIC PROCESS
A verbal description of the workings of the process is given in what follows, and then the assumptions that characterize it are listed and discussed.
At each moment of time firms choose profit-maximizing inputs and outputs, considering the given prices. This determines the "viE tua!" profits that are to be taken into account by households, to gether with prices and actual stocks, in the determination of their demands. Agents are thus unaware of disequilibrium. The fact that households know the virtual profits of the firms of which they own shares is, of course, a strong informational requirement. Price changes are a linear sign-preserving function of excess demands.
As to the dynamic behavior of stocks F an Edgeworth Process for exchange economies is a process in which if there are strictly We assume that the time paths of p, x, and v are given by a process satisfying the following assumptions:
Assumption I: This says that production feasibility is maintained through out the process. There is no similar assumption in [5}, but there the stability result obtained implies that feasibility is asympto tically attained. Here, however, the assumption is essential. For if firms are allowed to make unfeasible commitments, this may de termine that an allocation (x(t),v(t» € S is reached such that (x(t) ,vet»� is strictly Pareto superior to some Pareto optimal al location. In this case, the fact that all trades must be Pareto im proving would imply that the set of Pareto optima could never be approached.
Assumption III:
ving (p,x,v) as initial conditions remains in a bounded set. 10
9 Suitable conditions on the utility functions could insure that prices actual stocks remain positive, but we prefer to assume it directly.
10 Assumption III can be derived from more basic assumptions. See [4] . 
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The following discrete time example shows that Assumption VII is necessary.
Consider an economy with H households, one firm, and three commodities. The utility function of household 1 is Ul(Xl ,x 2 .X 3 ) = (xl,X 2 ,X 3 ) 1 �. The firm's production function need not be specified, except for the fact that it can transform one unit of good 2 into one unit of good 3, and vice-versa. We as sume that the firm is owned by household 1. Also, in the story that follows, households 2, 3, ... , H never trade. Given the Sdnnenschein-Debreu The discrete form of our price adjustment process is �p. '" Z i . i "" 2,3. Now, suppose that Xl(O) '" (1,1,2) and p(O) '" (1,2,1). and th k t, in period zero, the household sells one unit of, commodity 3, buys one unit of commodity 2, and receives the resulting profits from the firm. Then Xl( l ) '" (1,2,1), and, according to our assumption on excess demands and the discrete price adjust ment rule, p (1) "" (1,1,2) . Now, in period 1, househo ld 1 reverses the transac dons that it made in period zero, and receives the resulting profits. Then-; again according to our assumptions, prices return to their initial values. That is, xl(2) "" Xl(O), p(2) '" p(O). A cycle is thus formed in which house holds have constant utility but there is trade ad infinitum. Notice that the realized profits of the firm increase without bounds, but so do the lossesof household 1, due to adverse price changes.
4.
PROOF OF STABILITY
In this section the global stability of the process given by I-VII is proved. In other words, it is shown thatl for any (p (O) ,x (O),v (O» €: R�H+ 1 ) N x RFN, the corresponding solution to the system of differential equations given in I converges to some com petitive equilibrium. Before this is done, some preliminary re sults are needed. 12 Here the expression "competitive equilibrium" has the usual meaning, and not the one given to it elsewhere in this paper. That is, here "competitive equi lib rium" means a not necessarily autarc hic equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu e= conomy.
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The remark of footnote (12) applies here to the expression "Pareto optimal allocation" and in the next sentence to "feasible allocations". That is, the se concepts have here what their usual meanings are in Arrow-Debreu theory.
14 See 19, where it is shown that a limit towards which a motion converges is necessarily a rest point. Consider the function
where p* = (1 ,P2, ... ,PN) , is the UniqUe 1 : equilibrium price vector and that realized profits are also constant along this solution By Lemma 2 and Assumption V, (x**,v**) is a Pareto optimal allocation.
Then any limit point of (x(t) ,v(t» is also a Pareto optimal allocation, since at such a point, as at (x**, v**) , the utility of household h is a h o It follows from the strict quasiconcavity of utility functions that (x*, v*) is the unique limit point of (x{t) , Choose €>O, and assume that there is no 0>0 such that Reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3, we conclude that (19) cannot hold, and therefore we have a contradiction. Then for all �>O there exists some 0>0 such that V( p)�� and II (x-x*,v-v*l I 1 <0 imply p**'z (p,x,v»O, and thus V<O.
It follows that if V( p (t»<€ and for small enough 6>0, then V( p (,»<E for all ,>t. Since (x (t) ,v (t» converges to (x*,v*) and p** is a limit point of p( t), we conclude that lim p (t) p*. t+oo
CONCLUSION
In this paper we define an Edgeworth Process for an economy I with firms but no production, and prove its stability_ Since the Edgeworth Process had been previously defined and proved to be sta There are two limitations on the class of models that are com patible with the Edgeworth Process assumption. First, these models cannot allow speculation to occur. To see this, consider for sim plicity an exchange economy. Suppose that speculation is allowed.
One cannot impose the condition that utilities are increasing in time because household h might want to exchange its actual stock x h (t) for x h (t') , t'>t, with U h (x h (t» > U h (x h (t') in the hope that this would bring speculative gains that would b� reaped befo re or at equilibrium. If one tries to avoid this problem by cons training target utilities to be increasing in time, another kind of problem is found: prices may differ from what they were expected to be, and this implies the possibility of losses.
The second limitation is related to the introduction of money in the model. When a household sells a commodity, and receives mo ney in exchange, its actual utility decreases in many cases, even if money enters the utility function. It is an essential feature of money-mediated exchange that some agents receive a commodity that they do not desire for its own sake, viz. money, with the in tention of performing further trades in which that commodity is u sed to acquire other desired commodities. The behavior of such agents may be compared to that of speculators: they are accepting a temporary loss in (actual) utility, in order to obtain a gain later on. The discussion of the previous paragraph then applies to the present case, and we can conclude that the Edgeworth Process assumption is not compatible with money-mediated exchange.
Hany of the characteristics of the model we present are rela Therefore, given our assumption on expectations, the form of behav ior we model follO\1's from the assumption we made on ihe amount of information available to agents. Also, the reason why money is not explicitly introduced should now be clear, and without money in the model it is not unnatural to assume that all realized profits are distributed at each moment of time.
There is, however, one characteristic of the model that was not related to the above mentioned limitations. We did not allow production and consumption to occur outside of equilibrium. Our previous arguments do not imply that such an extension of the pr� sent model would not give a stable process, as long as speculative behavior is not permi-tted. This remains, however, an open question.
Another possible extension is to introduCe transaction cons traints, as done in [18} for the Hahn Process.
